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I. Introduction 
It is commonly thought that one of the primary channels through which money has an 
impact upon aggregate demand and hence prices and output is through its effects upon 
investment spending. In a bare-bones Keynesian-type system, an increase in money affects 
investment primarily by reducing market interest rates. In a Monetarist-type system, in 
addition to this indirect effect, an increase in money may have more direct effects upon 
investment spending through direct substitution out of money into investment goods.' In 
either approach the initial effects may be reinforced through accelerator effects. The change 
in aggregate demand generated by the change in investment spending will in turn alter the 
levels of output and prices. Expansionary fiscal actions may also alter investment spending 
by raising interest rates. However, this negative impact of expansionary fiscal actions on 
investment may be mitigated or even offset if the expansionary fiscal policy raises income 
and acceleration effects on investment are strong. The net effect of the expansionary fiscal 
action on investment spending is thus ambiguous. 
The aim of this paper is to examine empirically the impact of monetary and fiscal 
policy actions on investment spending, and to thereby provide evidence on how monetary 
and fiscal policy effects are transmitted to the macroeconomy. However, rather than focusing 
*An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Southern Economic Association meetings in November 
1984. The authors thank Charles Hegji for his helpful comments. 
1. As noted by B. Friedman [7] the transmission mechanisms for changes in money embedded in the general 
equilibrium models of Tobin [22] and Brunner-Meltzer [2] are essentially identical. In both models a change in the 
quantity of money upsets asset market equilibrium and sets offa chain of portfolio substitutions that ultimately affect he 
real sector of the economy. 
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upon total investment spending, the impacts of monetary and fiscal actions on residential 
construction, fixed investment, inventory investment, and consumer durables expenditures 
are analyzed separately. Consumer durable expenditures are included since the decision to 
purchase consumer durables is conceptually similar to the investment decision of firms. 
Thus, we present "disaggregated" evidence on the relationships among monetary policy, 
fiscal policy and the major components of investment spending. A reduced form method- 
ology is used in the empirical analysis. One reduced-form approach to analyzing the impact 
of the policy variables on investment spending is the estimation of St. Louis-type quations 
in which each type of investment spending is regressed on distributed lags of a monetary 
policy variable and a fiscal policy variable. This method has been employed by Rose [16; 17] 
to analyze the effects of monetary and fiscal policy actions on, among other things, con- 
sumer durables expenditures and various types of investment expenditures. However, even 
though this single equation approach has been frequently employed to analyze the macro 
effects of monetary and fiscal policy actions, the approach has been subjected to much 
criticism [4; 8; 9; 15]. Based upon these criticisms, an alternative approach is employed in 
this paper. 
The alternative reduced-form approach used in this paper, which is less restrictive than 
the single-equation approach, is the vector autoregressive modeling technique proposed by 
Hsiao [11; 12]. The vector autoregressive (VAR) approach can be thought of as a system of 
reduced-form equations with a separate equation for each variable in the system. The initial 
analysis in this paper is based upon three-equation models that contain separate equations 
for a particular type of investment spending, a monetary policy variable, and a fiscal policy 
variable; accordingly, the first set of models represents disaggregated VAR analogues to the 
traditional St. Louis equation. Unlike the traditional St. Louis model, however, no a priori 
assumptions are made about the exogeneity of the policy variables. The specification of the 
models provides evidence on the Granger-causal relations among the variables of the system, 
and the estimated systems can be used to provide estimates of the strength of these relations 
based upon variance decompositions computed from the systems. The variance decompo- 
sitions and their interpretation will be discussed later. 
While the three-variable VARs provide an interesting comparison to the traditional St. 
Louis framework, recent work has called into question empirical results which exclude the 
rate of interest. Specifically, Sims [20] has recently shown that the addition of an interest 
rate to a vector autoregressive system that contains money, a price variable, and an output 
measure has significant implications for the role of money shocks in altering prices and 
output. Based upon Sims's results and upon the fact that interest rates are an important link 
in the Keynesian view between changes in money and investment spending, four variable 
systems in which an interest rate is added to the systems described above are also analyzed. 
As described in more detail later, the addition of an interest rate allows inferences about 
whether most of the impact of a change in money on investment works through interest 
rates or whether, in addition to this interest rate channel, direct substitution between money 
and investment goods is important. Further, the four-variable models allow at least informal 
assessment as to whether the relative potency of monetary policy, which is a standard 
St. Louis-type result, is robust in the presence of the interest rate, which provides the tradi- 
tional Keynesian link between the real and financial sectors. 
The modeling technique is discussed in section II, and the three and four variable 
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models are presented in sections III and IV, respectively. Further discussion of the models is 
found in section V, and the last section contains concluding comments. 
II. Estimation Procedure2 
The methodology used to estimate the trivariate models analyzed here is the vector auto- 
regressive technique suggested by Hsiao [11; 12] and extended by Caines, Keng, and Sethi 
[3]. The VAR modeling technique is employed rather than a single equation or a structural 
model approach, since the VAR models avoid imposing potentially spurious a priori con- 
straints (such as, for example, exogeneity of the monetary variable in the investment equa- 
tions) on the model. The VAR technique employed involves the use of the Granger-causality 
definition in conjunction with Akaike's final prediction error criterion to impose restrictions 
on the estimation of the VAR. The technique allows each variable to depend upon a subset 
of the variables in the system and allows for different lag lengths for each variable in each 
equation. 
The VARs estimated in the manner described above differ from the unconstrained 
VARs estimated by Sims [19; 20], Fischer [6], and Dwyer [5] in which each variable de- 
pends upon all other variables in the system with the same lag length. One problem that 
emerges in the estimation of a Sims-type VAR is that lengthening the common lag by one 
increases the number of parameters to be estimated by the square of the number of variables 
and thus rapidly depletes the degrees of freedom available for estimation. The degrees of 
freedom problem becomes significant in estimating Sims-type systems since the lag length 
must be kept generous in order to avoid under-specifying the lag for one or more of the 
variables and thereby avoiding biased coefficient estimates. Further, there is no reason to 
believe that the same lag length is appropriate for all variables in each equation. 
The use of VARs to analyze our data set is motivated by Fischer's [6, 402] observation 
that vector autoregressions are ". .. a convenient way of summarizing empirical regularities 
and perhaps suggesting the predominant channels through which relations work." Further- 
more, Sims [21, 138], in a discussion of his VAR results, notes that ". . . careful attention to 
the historical data exerts an important discipline on what can be plausibly asserted about 
the way the economy works." However, the VAR is a reduced-form technique and it is thus 
difficult, based upon VAR results, to distinguish sharply among structural hypotheses. 
The Lucas critique is also potentially applicable to the VAR technique, and it is 
assumed in this paper that there were no changes in policy regimes over the estimation 
period. As Sims [21, 138] notes, "The U.S. postwar data contains enough information to 
give a useful characterization of the conditional distribution of the future of major macro- 
economic aggregates given the past. Although there is evidence that this structure changes 
over time, there is also evidence that it does not change suddenly, so that a model fit to the 
whole postwar period as if its parameters were fixed over that whole period is not badly 
biased because of parameter changes." 
Since the theory underlying the estimation of the VAR is based upon the use of station- 
ary data [12; 18], the first step in the Hsiao procedure is to suitably transform the data to 
achieve stationarity. The specific transformations u ed in this study are discussed in the next 
2. The material in this section is taken primarily from McMillin-Fackler [14]. 
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section; at this point it is sufficient to emphasize that stationary data are used. Details of the 
Hsiao procedure are provided in McMillin-Fackler [14] and will not be discussed here. 
III. Disaggregated "St. Louis" Equations 
Presented in this section are models of the major components of investment spending which 
are disaggregated, VAR analogues to the traditional St. Louis methodology. Quarterly data 
for nominal consumer durable expenditures, nominal fixed investment expenditures, nomi- 
nal inventory investment spending, the M1 definition of the money stock, nominal high 
employment government expenditures, and Moody's AAA corporate bond rate are used to 
estimate the various models. The corporate bond rate is employed as the relevant interest 
rate since, presumably, it is a long term rate that is most relevant for expenditures on long- 
lived assets.3 MI is chosen since it is the money stock definition that receives the most 
attention in monetary policy discussions. High-employment government expenditures are 
employed since this measure is designed to be purged of feedback from the current state of 
the economy to government expenditures. Variations in this measure are then the conse- 
quence of changes in spending programs.4 
As pointed out in section II, specification and estimation of the VARs requires sta- 
tionary data. The stationarity tests described in Ali-Thalheimer [1] and a simple test in 
which the transformed series was regressed on a constant and time were employed to deter- 
mine what transformations were required to achieve stationarity. In the latter test, if the 
coefficient on time was statistically significant, further transformations were deemed neces- 
sary. For durable expenditures, a first difference of log transformation was required to 
achieve stationarity while for the other investment measures and for money and high em- 
ployment expenditures, a second difference of log transformation was required to obtain 
stationary series. In the case of the corporate bond rate, it was found that a first difference of 
log transformation of this series was stationary.5 
In the VARs estimated here only lagged values of the system variables appear as right- 
hand variables in the system's equations. Following Hsiao [12], it is assumed that any con- 
temporaneous relationships are reflected in the correlation of error terms across the system's 
equations. Based upon this assumption, full-information maximum likelihood (FIML) is 
used to estimate the system. The specification of each model is checked by over- and under- 
fitting the system, estimating the modified systems by FIML, and then carrying out likeli- 
hood ratio tests of the adequacy of the specified system against each proposed modification. 
The likelihood ratio statistics are computed as -2 log (L"/L") where L' is the maximized 
likelihood of the constrained system (the modified system for under-fits but the specified 
3. A model for residential construction expenditures was also estimated using the secondary market yield on FHA 
mortgages as the relevant interest rate. The results are not qualitatively different from the system presented here using 
the AAA rate. We do not report the model using the FHA rate due to the generally different characteristics ofFHA 
mortgages compared with, say, conventional mortgages. 
4. Data for residential construction expenditures, non-residential construction expenditures, and durable goods 
expenditures are taken from the Survey of Current Business. Data for M 1I and high-employment expenditures are from 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and data for the AAA bond rate and the secondary market yield on FHA 
mortgages are from the Citibank data tape. 
5. The Ali-Thalheimer test suggested the presence of non-stationary seasonal variations in the AAA bond rate. As 
a consequence, seasonal differences were taken before further transformations were examined. 
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system for over-fits) and Lu is the maximized likelihood of the unconstrained system (the 
specified system for under-fits and the modified system for over-fits). This statistic asymp- 
totically follows a chi-square distribution with n degrees of freedom, where n is the number 
of imposed contraints. 
Using the estimation procedure described in section II, the three variable VAR model 
for fixed investment expenditures, estimated over the period 1959:1-1979:46, is 
FII 
Fa1l(L) aA2(L) 
ai3(L) FI, al I el 
M1, = a2?( ) a422(L) 0 M + a2 + e2 (1) 
EHE, 0 a33 (L)J EHE, a3] [e3 
where FI, is the second difference of the log of fixed investment expenditures, Ml is the 
second difference of the log of the narrow money stock, EHE is the second difference of the 
log of high employment expenditures, ai, represents the k lag coefficients on variablej in 
equation i, the a, are constants, and the ei are error terms. As Sims [19] has noted, it is 
difficult to interpret the individual autoregressive coefficients because of the reduced form 
nature of the model; these coefficients are not reported here but are available on request. 
The adequacy of this model is tested by over- and under-fitting the system and then 
conducting likelihood ratio tests of the modified systems against system (1). These tests are 
presented in Table I and are interpreted in the following way: hypotheses (a)-(c) impose 
zero restrictions on the non-zero off-diagonal elements and hypotheses (d)-(f) ease the zero 
restrictions on the zero off-diagonal elements. We see that the zero restrictions in (a)-(c) are 
rejected while the tests of hypotheses (d)-(f) suggest that the zero restrictions of system (1) 
are appropriate. Tests of hypotheses (g)-(k) suggest that shorter lags on the respective vari- 
ables are inappropriate. Tests of hypotheses (1)-(s) suggest that extending the lags on the 
non-zero elements of the system never generates a significant improvement in the system. 
Although other hypothesis tests are possible, the tests reported in Table I indicate that 
system (1) appears to be an adequate VAR representation of the three variables under study. 
The implications of system (1) will now be discussed. As Granger [10] proved, a zero- 
element in the off-diagonal elements of a system like (1) indicates the absence of direct 
Granger-causality from one variable to another. Thus we see that both Ml and EHE 
Granger-cause FI. However, there appears to be feedback from FI to Ml, which may 
represent Federal Reserve concern for a key element in the business cycle, spending on 
plant and equipment. However, neither FI nor Ml feeds back into our measure of fiscal 
policy, EHE. 
Sims [21] has recently argued that the strength of the Granger-causal relations can be 
measured from variance decompositions. Variance decompositions (VDCs) show the pro- 
portion of forecast error variance for each variable that is attributable to its own innovations 
and to shocks to the other system variables. As Sims [21, 131] notes, "A variable that is 
optimally forecast from its own lagged values will have all its forecast error variance ac- 
counted for by its own disturbances." Thus if either Ml or EHE explain only a small portion 
of the forecast error variance of FI, we will interpret his as evidence of a weak Granger- 
causal relation. 
6. The sample period ends in 1979 because of a switch by the Federal Reserve in October from an interest rate 
operating uide to a reserves oriented operating uide. Strictly speaking, the sample should end in 1979:3, but the 
additional observation had no effect on the results. 
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Table I. Tests of Model Adequacy, Equation System Ia 
Hypothesis Likelihood Ratio Statistic 
(a) al2(L) = 0 16.60* 
(b) al3(L) = 0 6.94** 
(c) a,,(L) = 0 9.76** 
(d) a 3(L) 1.74 
(e) a4 (L) 0.74 
(f) a42(L) 0.32 
(g) all~(L) 10.74*** 
(h) a42(L) 10.46** 
(i) aI (L), aa2(L) 20.32*** 
(j) a22(L) 9.10* 
(k) a' (L) 8.74* 
(1) a;, (L) 1.96 
(m) a> 2(L) 0.18 
(n) a 3(L) 1.34 
(o) a ,(L), a8,(L), a 3(L) 2.10 
(p) a ,(L) 0.86 
(q) a 62(L) 0.70 
(r) a(L), a6(L) 1.98 
(s) a'(L) 1.42 
a.* = significant at .025 level. 
** = significant at .01 level. 
*** = significant at .005 level. 
Variance decompositions for system (1) are generated in the manner described by Sims 
[20]. This method recognizes that, in general, the correlation of residuals across equations is 
not zero. In calculating the VDCs the variables are ordered in a particular fashion. Because 
of the cross-equation residual correlation, when a variable higher in the order changes, 
variables lower in the order are assumed to change. The extent of the change depends upon 
the covariance of the variables higher in the order with those lower in the order. Because of 
this the VDCs may be sensitive to the ordering of the variables o that it is useful to examine 
the VDCs based on several orderings. 
Variance decompositions for system (1) are presented in Table II, part 1. The orderings 
reported reflect the primary focus of the paper on the effects of monetary and fiscal policy 
on investment. The orderings are: (1) Ml, FI, EHE, and (2) EHE, FI, and Ml. The VDCs 
are presented in Table II, I.A. (first ordering) and Table II, 1.B. (second ordering). A twenty 
quarter horizon is employed in order to allow the dynamics of the system to be worked out. 
However, the results for the twenty quarter horizon do not differ in any substantive way 
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Table II. Variance Decompositions-Three Variable Systems: Twenty Quarter Horizons 
1. System: FI, MI, EHE 2. Sistem: INV, MI, EHE 
A: Ordering: MI, FI, EHE A: Ordering: MI, INV, EHE 
Relative Explained by Relative Explained by 
Variation in MI FI EHE Variation in MI INV EHE 
MI 78.9 20.4 0.7 MI 98.0 1.6 0.4 
FI 30.4 51.4 18.2 INV 21.6 74.4 4.4 
EHE 3.0 2.8 94.2 EHE 0 1.4 98.6 
B: Ordering: EHE, FI, MI B: Ordering: EHE, INV, MI 
Relative Explained by Relative Explained by 
Variation in EHE FI MI Variation in EHE INV MI 
EHE 98.3 1.6 0.1 EHE 100.0 0 0 
FI 20.6 59.6 19.8 INV 10.6 70.4 19.0 
MI 2.6 20.1 77.3 MI 1.9 4.2 93.9 
.3. Siystem: RE, MI, EHE 4. Siystem: DE, MI, EHE 
A: Ordering: MI, RE, EHE A: Ordering: MI, DE, EHE 
Relative Explained by Relative Explained by 
Variation in MI RE EHE Variation in MI DE EHE 
MI 100 0 0 MI 89.8 6.0 4.2 
RE 10.2 83.6 6.2 DE 38.2 57.4 4.4 
EHE 1.3 0 98.7 EHE 1.2 0.4 98.4 
B: Ordering: EHE, RE, MI B: Ordering: EHE, DE, MI 
Relative Explained by Relative Explained by 
Variation in EHE RE MI Variation in EHE DE MI 
EHE 100 0 0 EHE 100 0 0 
RE 5.2 85.3 9.5 DE 4.8 70.0 25.2 
MI 1.6 17.2 81.2 MI 9.5 4.0 86.5 
from VDCs for four, eight, twelve, and sixteen quarters. As a consequence, these VDCs are 
not reported here but are available on request. We see that regardless of the ordering the 
variance in Ml and EHE is almost completely explained by their own innovations. In 
ordering A, money innovations explain about 30% of the variance of FI; this proportion 
drops to about 20% in ordering B. EHE explains about 18% of the variance of FI in 
ordering A and about 21% in ordering B. Ml thus explains no less of the variance in FI 
than does EHE; it appears that the effects of Ml on FI are at least as important as EHE in 
determining fixed investment. 
The specification of the three-variable model for inventory investment is discussed 
next. The non-zero elements of the INV model, analogous to those of system (1), are: 
aI (L), a12 (L), a13 (L), a22 (L), and a33 (L). To conserve space, the results of tests of model 
adequacy are not reported here but are available on request. 
For the INV system, the Granger-causality implications of the system are somewhat 
different than for the FI system. Specifically, both M1 and EHE Granger-cause inventory 
investment and both are free of feedback from spending on inventories. The lack of feed- 
back from INV to both Ml and EHE is further evidenced by the fact that, for the twenty- 
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quarter variance decompositions (Table II, 2), for both orderings virtually all of the variance 
in both Ml and EHE is explained by their own innovations. In addition, in ordering A, Ml 
innovations explain about 22% of the variance in INV while in ordering B this percentage 
declines only marginally, to 19%. EHE, in contrast, explains substantially less of INV 
variance, ranging from about 4% in ordering A to about 11% in ordering B. Thus, it appears 
that Ml shocks dominate EHE in explaining variability in INV. 
The specifications of the three-variable models for residential expenditures (RE) and 
consumer durables expenditures (DE) are now discussed. The non-zero elements of the 
model for RE are: a 1' (L), a2(L), aI3 (L), a22(L), and a33(L). The non-zero elements of the 1 128 13 Tn4 3element 
s 
onse model for DE are: a(L), (L), an2(L), a3(L), a(L), a2(L),n order to conserve 
space, the results of the tests of model adequacy similar to those in Table I are not presented 
here but are available upon request from the authors. Based upon these tests, each model in 
judged adequate. 
For RE, the Granger-causality implications of the system are identical to those for INV. 
RE are Granger-caused by both Ml and EHE while both Ml and EHE are free of feedback 
from the other system variables. From the twenty-quarter variance decompositions (Table 
II, 3), we see that for both orderings, most of the variance in both Ml and EHE is explained 
by their own innovations. In ordering A, Ml innovations explain about 10.2 percent of the 
variance in RE while in ordering B this percentage drops only slightly to 9.5%. Ml thus 
explains substantially less of the variance in RE than it does for FI. EHE, regardless of 
ordering, explains very little of the variation in RE; again, it appears that monetary shocks 
have a greater effect on RE than do shocks to EHE. VDCs for four, eight, twelve, and 
sixteen quarters again do not differ substantatively from those in Table II. These results are 
also available on request. 
The Granger-causality implications of the system for DE are quite similar to those for 
FI in that there is direct Granger-causality from DE to Ml. However, from the variance 
decompositions in part 4 of Table II we see that regardless of the ordering, innovations in 
DE explain very little of the variance in Ml. The Granger-causality from DE to Ml thus 
appears to be quite weak, and as before, money is essentially free of feedback from either 
DE or EHE. EHE are also free of feedback from either DE or Ml. For ordering A, the 
amount of variation in DE explained by Ml is 38% while EHE explains only 4.4% of the 
variation in DE. In ordering B, Ml shocks explain 25% of the variation in DE while shocks 
to EHE explain only 5%. 
The results of the analysis above support the results of the highly-aggregated St. Louis- 
type models that monetary policy generally dominates fiscal policy in accounting for un- 
anticipated movements in various investment categories. In only one case (that of fixed 
investment) might it be argued that fiscal policy is as important as monetary policy in 
explaining the variability of the key sub-component of investment expenditures; in the 
others the relative importance of monetary policy is much more likely. 
IV. Disaggregated "Keynesian" Equations 
Although the results of the analysis of the three-variable models are of interest, we recall 
that in the bare-bones Keynesian view of the monetary transmission mechanism, interest 
rates are the key link between changes in money and investment expenditures. We also 
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recall that Sims [20] found that addition of an interest rate to a system that previously 
excluded such a rate lessened the ability of monetary shocks to explain variations in output 
and prices. Further, the Sims analysis is performed in the absence of any explicit fiscal 
policy variables so that the relative importance of monetary and fiscal policies, controlling 
for the interest rate, is still an open question. For these reasons we now turn to an analysis of 
four variable VARs in which an interest rate is added to each of the three variable systems 
previously discussed. These four variable models provide some evidence on the distinctions 
between the standard textbook Keynesian view of the monetary transmission mechanism 
and the standard monetarist conception of this process. If the standard textbook Keynesian 
view is correct, we would expect to find direct causality from money to interest rates and 
from interest rates to investment expenditures with no direct causality from money to invest- 
ment. In the monetarist view, we would expect direct causality from money to investment as 
well as indirect causality from money to interest rates and from interest rates to investment. 
Based upon the estimation technique described earlier, the four variable VAR model 
for fixed investment spending estimated over the period 1959:1-1979:4 is 
03 
6 4 SFI, a(L) a62(L) a34(L) a'4(L) FI, a el 
MI, a ,,(L) a22(L) a23(L) 0 MI, a2 e2 
-+ + (2) AA(L) a21(L) a 2(L) 0 AAA a3 e3 
EHE, L 0 0 
a43(L) 
a 
4(L)J EHEJ a4J Le4 
where FI, Ml, and EHE are as previously defined, AAA is the first difference of log trans- 
formation of the AAA corporate bond rate, ai, represents the k lag coefficients on variablej 
in equation i, the a, are constants, and the ei are error terms. The individual coefficient 
estimates are available on request. The adequacy of the model is assessed in the manner 
described earlier. These likelihood ratio tests indicate that system (2) appears to be an 
adequate representation of the four variables under study. In order to conserve space, these 
test results are not given here but are available upon request. 
From (2), we see that Ml, AAA, and EHE directly Granger-cause FI. In addition, 
there is indirect Granger-causality from Ml to FI since Ml Granger-causes AAA. An 
interpretation of this pattern is that Ml affects FI by altering interest rates and by direct 
substitution out of money balances into FI. Likewise, there is indirect Granger-causality 
from AAA to FI since AAA Granger-causes Ml. This latter causality pattern may reflect 
Federal Reserve concern for financial market stability; several reaction function studies also 
provide evidence of such a concern by the Federal Reserve. See, for example, McMillin- 
Beard [13] and the studies cited therein. In addition to direct Granger-causality from Ml to 
AAA, we see that FI also directly Granger-causes AAA. Variations in FI, by affecting 
aggregate output, alter money demand, and this variation in money demand would be 
expected to affect AAA. We also find that there is direct Granger-causality from AAA to 
EHE, and, since Ml and FI Granger-cause AAA, there appears to be indirect causality 
from these two variables to EHE. Thus, unlike the three-variable systems, there appears to 
be feedback from at least some of the systems' variables to Ml and EHE. The strength of 
this feedback is assessed next. 
Variance decompositions for system (2) are presented in Table III, part 1. Two order- 
ings are employed; one ordering is Ml, FI, AAA, and EHE while the second ordering is 
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Table III. Variance Decompositions--Four Variable Systems: Twenty Quarter Horizons 
1. Siystem: FI, MI, AAA, EHE 2. System: INV, MI, AAA, EHE 
A: Ordering: MI, FI, AAA, EHE A: Ordering: MI, INV, AAA, EHE 
Relative Explained by Relative Explained by 
Variation in MI FI AAA EHE Variation in MI INV AAA EHE 
MI 68.6 14.1 16.0 1.3 MI 77.1 8.6 14.3 0 
FI 21.4 54.9 6.6 17.1 INV 23.1 64.8 12.1 0 
AAA 20.1 12.1 66.3 1.5 AAA 21.5 8.3 70.2 0 
EHE 0.1 0.3 2.6 97.0 EHE 0.6 2.0 1.2 96.2 
B: Ordering: EHE, FI, AAA, MI B: Ordering: EHE, INV, AAA, MI 
Relative Explained by Relative Explained by 
Variation in EHE FI AAA MI Variation in EHE INV AAA MI 
EHE 98.6 1.4 0 0 EHE 100.0 0 0 0 
FI 25. 1 64.3 3.0 7.6 IN V 6.0 59.4 14.3 20.3 
AAA 2.6 14.5 70.1 12.8 AAA 2.9 3.3 77.1 16.7 
MI 1.7 24.2 18.9 55.6 MI 0.8 17.8 11.1 70.3 
3. Siystem: RE, MI, AAA, EHE 4. System: DE, MI, AAA, EHE 
A: Ordering: MI, RE, AAA, EHE A: Ordering: MI, DE, AAA, EHE 
Relative Explained by Relative Explained by 
Variation in MI RE AAA EHE Variation in MI DE AAA EHE 
MI 74.1 18.3 7.6 0 MI 88.4 5.3 3.5 2.8 
RE 26.5 70.2 3.3 0 DE 28.9 47.0 4.3 19.8 
AAA 30.2 16.4 53.4 0 AAA 41.2 18.4 35.2 5.2 
EHE 0.8 2.4 6.2 90.6 EHE 11.4 1.3 2.5 84.8 
B. Ordering: EHE, RE, AAA, MI B. Ordering: EHE, DE, AAA, MI 
Relative Explained by Relative Explained by 
Variation in EHE RE AAA MI Variation in EHE DE AAA MI 
EHE 94.1 0 5.8 0.1 EHE 96.0 1.2 1.7 1.1 
RE 2.4 83.8 6.1 7.7 DE 21.2 52.0 8.7 18.0 
AAA 1.1 7.0 68.3 23.6 AAA 6.3 21.0 38.3 34.4 
MI 1.8 11.3 14.5 32.4 MI 9.0 4.5 12.7 73.9 
EHE, FI, AAA, and M1. The VDCs are presented in Table III, L.A (first ordering) and 
Table III, L.B (second ordering). Again, only the results for a twenty-quarter horizon are 
reported since these results were substantially the same as at shorter horizons of four, eight, 
twelve, and sixteen quarters. We see that in ordering A, Ml shocks explain about 21% of 
the variation in FI, but this proportion drops to about 8% in ordering B. Thus, when the 
interest rate is included in the system, we find that the percentage of total variation in FI 
explained by Ml drops to two-thirds to one-half that explained by Ml in the three variable 
system. This result is similar to that in Sims [20] although the system variables are quite 
different. As in the three-variable FI system, fiscal policy appears to be at least as important 
as monetary policy in explaining the variability of fixed investment spending. Further, the 
presence of the interest rate does not appreciably alter the impact of EHE on FI. We also see 
that Ml shocks explain a much larger fraction of the variation in AAA regardless of the 
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ordering of the variables; fiscal policy, however, has little apparent impact on interest rates, 
an interesting result in light of recent discussion about the role of government finance in 
influencing the financial markets. 
The specifications of the four variable models for inventory expenditures, residential 
expenditures, and consumer durables expenditures will now be discussed. The non-zero 
elements of the INVmodel are: a (L), a12(L), a43(L), a2(L), a3(L), a, (L)(L), a32(L), 
a3(L), 4 3 5 3 a43(L), and a44(L). The non-zero elements of the model for RE are: a1l(L), a 2(L), a13(L), 
4 1 6 9 12 4 3 a22(L), a23(L), a31 (L), a32(L), a33(L), a43(L), and a44(L). The non-zero elements of the 
7 4 I 96II 
model for DE are: aI,(L), a 2(L), a43(L), a'4(L), a',(L), a22(L), a23(L), a31(L), a3(L), 
12 4 3 
a33(L), a43(L), and a44(L). As before, tests of model adequacy suggest that each model is 
adequate, and the results of these tests are available upon request. 
The Granger-causality results implicit in the INV and RE systems are identical. Among 
the more interesting are the results that: (i) EHE does not Granger-cause either INV or RE, 
either directly or indirectly; (ii) both Ml and AAA exert independent influences upon INV 
and RE; and (iii) bidirectional causality exists between AAA and Ml but there is no 
Granger-causality from high employment spending to the interest rate. Similar to the cor- 
responding trivariate models, the estimated systems including the interest rate tend to sup- 
port a disaggregated St. Louis-type conclusion regarding the relative effects of monetary 
and fiscal policies on key components of investment expenditures. 
The conclusion reached above regarding the relative potency of monetary policy is 
reinforced by examining the variance decomposition results; see Table III, parts 2 and 3. 
For the inventory investment system, innovations to Ml account for at least 20% of the 
variance of INV, regardless of the selected ordering, while EHE explains at most 6%. For 
the RE system, Ml explains 26% of the variability in residential spending in ordering A, a 
proportion which declines sharply to about 8% in ordering B. However, even when EHE is 
positioned first in the ordering, it only explains an apparently negligible 2% of RE fluc- 
tuations. 
The Granger-causality results for the DE system are identical to those of the FI sys- 
tem. Ml and AAA directly Granger-cause DE; however, although EHE did not directly 
Granger-cause either INV or RE in these four-variable systems, there is direct Granger- 
causality from EHE to DE. One explanation of this result is that DE are more responsive to 
variations in nominal income generated by changes in EHE than are FI or RE. In addition 
to the direct causality from Ml and AAA to DE, there is again indirect causality from Ml 
to DE through the effects of MI on AAA and from AAA to DE through the effects of 
AAA on Ml. There is also direct Granger-causality from DE to AAA as well as from Ml 
to AAA. Likewise, DE directly Granger-causes Ml as does AAA. Finally, there is direct 
causality from AAA to EHE as well as indirect causality from Ml and DE to EHE operat- 
ing through their effects on AAA. 
As before, the strength of these causality relations is assessed by examining VDCs for 
the DE system. These VDCs are reported in Table III, 4.A and 4.B. Ml again explains a 
substantial fraction of the variance of DE and AAA regardless of ordering. However, the 
proportion of the variation in DE explained by Ml falls with the addition of the interest rate 
to the VAR model. Feedback from the other system variables to Ml appears to be weak, 
although in the second ordering AAA explains about 13% of the variation in Ml. EHE 
explains about 20% of the variation in DE regardless of ordering. This result is also quite 
different from the VDCs for the three variable DE system. However, unlike Ml, the addition 
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of the interest rate to the system raised the proportion of the variance in DE explained by 
EHE. EHE does not explain much of the variance in AAA, a result similar to the other 
systems. Feedback from the other system variables to EHE appears, as in the other systems, 
to be weak. 
The results for our four-variable models suggest a number of conclusions. First, as in 
the three variable models in section III, monetary policy continues to dominate fiscal policy 
in terms of explaining disaggregated investment expenditures despite the explicit inclusion 
of the interest rate. Second, even in the presence of the interest rate, money invariably 
contributes to the explanation of the major components of investment, a result consistent 
with the "monetarist" transmission mechanism. Third, as in the three-variable systems, high 
employment expenditures are relatively unimportant in the determination of investment 
spending. 
V. Conclusions 
The aim of this paper has been to assess the impact of monetary and fiscal policy actions on 
investment expenditures. The initial analysis was conducted with three-variable vector auto- 
regressive systems which contained a category of investment expenditures--fixed invest- 
ment expenditures, inventory investment expenditures, residential expenditures, or con- 
sumer durable expenditures--along with the narrow money stock and high-employment 
government expenditures. Subsequent analysis was performed within a four-variable vector 
autoregressive framework which added an interest rate to the three-variable vector auto- 
regressions. 
In all of the three-variable and four-variable vector autoregressive systems, we found 
that M1 Granger-causes investment expenditures. The variance decompositions based 
upon these systems suggest a nontrivial effect of M1 on investment. High employment 
expenditures were found to Granger-cause investment in all of the three-variable systems 
and in the four-variable systems for consumer durable expenditures and fixed investment. 
However, the variance decompositions uggest that M1 typically has much stronger effects 
upon investment han do high employment expenditures. These results generally suggest 
that any causality from high employment expenditures to investment expenditures is rela- 
tively weak. 
It should also be noted that when the interest rate was added to the systems, direct 
causality from M1 to investment was observed as was indirect causality from M1 to invest- 
ment through the effects of M1 on the interest rate. This result is suggestive that the broader 
view of the transmission mechanism in which there is direct substitution out of money 
balances into investment goods as well as an effect operating through market rates of in- 
terest is more appropriate than the view in which monetary actions affect investment spend- 
ing solely by altering market interest rates. 
Finally, we note that although in several of the systems there is direct as well as indirect 
Granger-causality from the other system variables to money and high employment expendi- 
tures, this feedback is very weak. The variance decompositions uggest that most of the 
variation in both Ml and high employment expenditures is explained by their own inno- 
vations. 
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